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Abstract
The scholarship on contracting generally argues that markets for social services are weak and 
lacking in competition. Using data gathered from Florida’s largest social service agency, the 
Department of Children and Families, this article adds to the discussion by constructing a more 
rigorous measure of competition that accounts for the quality of bidding entities. The findings 
indicate that while the measures used in earlier studies align reasonably well with the raw number 
of initial responders to competitive solicitations, they tend to overestimate competition when 
the quality component is included in the analysis. That is, social service markets may be even 
weaker than previously reported. Furthermore, an examination of the relationship between 
competition and performance fails to find a significant association.
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A common argument for contracting out public services is that, by inviting private sector actors 
to participate in service production, we can break government monopolies and garner benefits in 
terms of both quality and efficiency (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987, 2000). While many 
of the early claims regarding the advantages of privatization are associated with hard services 
(i.e., services that are easily measured and defined, such as waste collection; see, for example, 
Kemper & Quigley, 1976; McDavid, 1985), the same arguments are made regarding soft services 
(i.e., services that are much harder to measure and define, such as social services; see DeHoog, 
1984; Kettl, 1993). Competition is at the center of debating the merits of privatization. To the 
present, the majority of research concludes that social service markets are, at best, weakly com-
petitive (DeHoog, 1984; Donahue, 1989; Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Schlesinger, Dorward, & 
Pulice, 1986; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Van Slyke, 2003).
In the past, scholars have gauged competition in a variety of ways. Some use only jurisdiction-
wide, crude measures that rely on the overall perception and recollection of public managers 
(DeHoog, 1984; Van Slyke, 2003). Others use proxies such as population and metro status to 
broadly estimate the competitiveness of vendor markets in the region (Brown & Potoski, 2003; 
S. Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2008; Levin & Tadelis, 2010). Still others develop more objec-
tive and service-specific estimates such as counting the number of bidders although such figures 
are often driven by the recollection of survey respondents (Hefetz & Warner, 2012). Despite the 
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multiplicity of past studies examining this topic, what has been largely uninvestigated is the 
extent of competition as determined by the exact number of bidders drawn from contract docu-
ments (see Savas, 2002, for an exception) and, more importantly, the quality of those 
respondents.
The main purpose of this study is to better understand the nature of soft service markets by 
operationalizing competition in a more stringent manner, namely, the number of acceptable bid-
ders, than has been done in the past. In doing so, I examine how scholars have previously identi-
fied and evaluated competition, compare some of these measures to my new construct, and assess 
whether and how closely they converge with one another. I also investigate the quality of losing 
bidders to see whether they are likely capable of enforcing market discipline. Finally, I perform 
a rudimentary exploration of the link between competition and performance to see whether the 
assertions of market theory regarding the merits of competition hold. Using data gathered from 
the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Florida’s largest social service agency, the 
results indicate that the existing measures perform reasonably well in gauging competition when 
considering only quantitative aspects. However, they tend to overestimate the robustness of 
social service markets when compared with a more rigorous method assessing the quality com-
ponent. In addition, there is a lack of a relationship between competitive sourcing and vendor 
performance. On the other hand, losing bidders appear to stack up pretty well when compared 
with winners on bid scores.
The article progresses as follows: It opens with a discussion of what competition is and why 
it matters as well as a review of the literature focused on defining competitive thresholds (i.e., 
How many bidders are needed to maximize the gains associated with competition?). This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of how the concept has been measured and accounted for in past research 
as well as the contribution I make in this regard. Next come a review of the DCF’s use of con-
tracts and grants, a discussion of the data and how they are collected, followed by analyses of the 
data. Finally, the article closes with an assessment of the implications of this research and ave-
nues for further inquiry.
Why Is Competition Important? How Much Is Enough?
When markets are not robust in terms of the numbers of buyers and sellers, inefficient allocations 
of resources tend to result as adequate price signals are not present and actors can influence 
prices (Vickrey, 1961). While it is possible that a public agency tasked with controlling the mar-
ket “might be able to create the conditions whereby the marginal conditions for efficient resource 
allocation could be maintained,” the costs of operating this type of a “command” system would 
likely be prohibitive (Vickrey, 1961, p. 8). The crux of the problem is that such an agency would 
be dependent on both the buyers and sellers to truthfully and accurately report their marginal-
valuations and marginal-costs, respectively. A relatively low-cost solution to this dilemma is the 
introduction of auctions (Vickrey, 1961). While there are a variety of types of auctions (see 
Klemperer, 2004; Milgrom, 1989, for good reviews of such institutions), they share the common 
characteristic of “elicit[ing] information, in the form of bids, from potential buyers regarding 
their willingness to pay and the outcome—that is, who wins what and pays how much—is deter-
mined solely on the basis of the received information” (Krishna, 2002, pp. 6-7). It is important to 
point out that in this literature, there is considered to be no formal distinction between “normal” 
auctions, in which auctioneers are the sellers, and “procurement” auctions, in which auctioneers 
are the buyers (Klemperer, 2004; Krishna, 2002; McAfee & McMillan, 1987). Governments 
most commonly employ what are termed “first-price, sealed-bid” procurement auctions in 
attempts to competitively procure social services. In these types of auctions, prospective vendors 
submit confidential bids that are evaluated by government officials who, based on the informa-
tion received in the bids, choose an organization with which to contract (Klemperer, 2004; 
Krishna, 2002).
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However, the worry is that if there are not enough bidders for an auction, suboptimal results 
may be obtained. There are two primary concerns. First, small numbers might give bidders infor-
mational advantages in that they can deduce the capacities of their competitors and bid accord-
ingly (i.e., lower than their valuation, but higher than they believe their competitors are capable 
of). At the extreme, a single bidder, if aware of its status, can offer an absurdly low bid that the 
government may be forced to take (see Klemperer, 2004, p. 107, for examples). Second, when 
there is a small number of competitors, collusion might be more common (Selten, 1973). In the 
case of auctions, this would mean that potential bidders coordinate their efforts to ensure a low 
price for the agreed upon winner (Krishna, 2002). This would especially be a concern when there 
are multiple lots for sale such that bidders can organize to ensure the colluders each gain their 
preferred “wins” (Klemperer, 2004).
While public administration scholars infrequently cite the “auction theory” literature reviewed 
above, their preferred lens, agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) addresses 
many of the same issues. In this model, vendors are seen as self-interested, and potentially oppor-
tunistic, participants that must be kept “in-line” by contracting governments (see Eisenhardt, 
1989 and Van Slyke, 2007, for good discussions). Competition assists the principal (i.e., govern-
ment) in two critical ways. First, as posited by auction theory, it forces bidders to reveal informa-
tion they might not otherwise accurately share. In noncompetitive situations, vendors have an 
incentive to lead the principal to believe that production costs are higher than they actually are in 
an effort to extract rents. However, this incentive is diminished in competitive procurement envi-
ronments, since high-priced bids lower the probability of winning contracts. Hence, in the pres-
ence of competition, potential vendors can be expected to bid closer to their true production costs 
(DeHoog, 1984). Second, in what could be considered an extension of auction theory (since 
auction theory does not directly address performance), competition can also serve to control post-
award behavior. Vendors who underperform or are inefficient can be replaced by competitors that 
are “waiting in the wings.” Even well-performing vendors might be at risk if innovative competi-
tors discover improved production techniques that lower their costs below that of the incumbent 
(Savas, 2000). In sum, according to agency theory competition can be expected to lead to effi-
cient, responsive, and high quality service delivery as producers strive to ensure their survival 
and maximize profits by providing the best service at the lowest possible price. This dynamic has 
been termed the “competition prescription” (Kettl, 1993). Cohen (2001, p. 434) highlights the 
importance of competition in stating that “the problem of organizational waste and inefficiency 
occurs in both [the public and private] sectors and stems from habits born of monopoly” (see also 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).
While it is generally accepted that “[i]ncreasing the number of bidders increases the revenue 
on average of the seller” (McAfee & McMillan, 1987, p. 711), an enduring question is exactly 
how many competitors must there be to gain these purported benefits? Over the years, a variety 
of economists and management scholars have addressed this question utilizing the auction theory 
framework. The most common approach has been to examine public or private auctions or mar-
kets for goods, commodities, or services to determine the number of participants required to 
minimize collusion and otherwise ensure attainment of the most competitive price (i.e., the low-
est for buyers or highest for sellers). In one of the earliest studies, taking a game theoretic 
approach, Selten (1973) finds that collusion is less likely if a market has at least five firms. Fewer 
than this and the environment may become oligopolistic in nature, to the detriment of the buyer 
of the good or service. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) examine five professional and retail markets 
(doctors, dentists, druggists, plumbers, and tire dealers) and come to the conclusion that markets 
should have three to five participants to ensure the benefits of competition are captured, but the 
key is the third entrant. While prices continue to fall with the addition of the fourth and fifth 
participants, the impacts are diminished. Looking at auction markets for municipal bonds and 
offshore oil leases and National Forest Service timber sales, Brannman, Klein, and Weiss (1987) 
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find that competitive pricing is achieved when there are between about five and eight bidders. 
Keisler and Buehring (2005) model the impacts of competition when there are economies of 
scale to be had and government must buy a fixed quantity of a good from the market. They find 
that the largest reductions in vendor profit occur with the introduction of the third bidder and 
savings continue through at least the fifth entrant into the market. Their model further indicates 
that having more than five vendors might drive profits down to essentially zero and make the 
market unsustainable. In the end they recommend that “government buyers should attempt to 
have four vendors” (p. 313). MacDonald, Handy, and Plato (2002) study United States Department 
of Agriculture procurement of five commodities (all-purpose flour, bakery flour, pasta, vegetable 
oil, and peanut butter) and find that prices generally drop until there are four to five bidders. 
Finally, Gupta (2002) examines sealed -bid auctions for highway construction in Florida. Her 
results indicate “that a minimum of six to eight bidders are required to attain the competitive 
threshold. Once six to eight bidders enter the market, the low winning bid is unaffected by addi-
tional entry” (p. 22).
The above indicates it is likely that governments will see substantial cost savings if they can 
attract at least three bidders. However, attracting four to five appears best for achieving optimal 
gains. It should be noted that previous study findings are heavily drawn from commonly market-
able business trades and the procurement of commodities, and as a result, the competitive thresh-
olds identified in these studies may not be directly applicable to government outsourcing of 
public services. Nevertheless, the knowledge gleaned from this literature can be informative and 
serves as guidance to public management scholars as they pursue refinement in measuring com-
petition among the broad scope of government services.
Measuring Competition
A review of the public management literature indicates that scholars generally adopt one of five 
methods to measure levels of competition. Each has its advantages and disadvantages and the 
appropriateness of any particular approach depends on the specific research question and design 
involved in a given study.
Case Studies and General Perceptions of Sufficiency
Estimates of the robustness of service markets are often inferred through the use of qualitative 
case study methods in which the researcher interviews persons associated with a service, pro-
gram, or agency (e.g., DeHoog, 1984; Johnston, Romzek, & Wood, 2004; Smith & Smyth, 1996; 
Van Slyke, 2003). The focus of such studies is generally on acquiring in-depth knowledge of the 
workings of the related systems and relationships. Competition, per se, is not usually of key inter-
est, although it is an important environmental factor that needs to be accounted for. As such, 
many of the findings regarding competition in such studies take on almost anecdotal qualities, 
where interviewees remark on a common lack of suitable vendors or discuss specific procure-
ment competitions that failed to garner much interest from the private sector. As is always a 
concern in case studies, the generalizability of such findings is in question.
Another technique, most commonly employed in research utilizing large-N surveys, is to ask 
respondents about their perceptions regarding the sufficiency of competition in general terms. 
For example, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) has been conduct-
ing their “Profile of local government service delivery choices” approximately every 5 years 
since 1982 (with the most recent iteration occurring in 2007). In these surveys (starting in 1988), 
ICMA asks a two-part question. First, respondents are queried as to whether their jurisdiction has 
encountered any obstacles to privatization. If yes, they are then asked to choose all applicable 
obstacles from a menu of possible options, one of which is a lack of competent vendors. Such 
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information is, of course, of limited research value in that one cannot identify the true nature or 
extent of the problem. That is, one cannot discern whether the problem is widespread or confined 
to a single service, which makes evaluating the impact of competition problematic. This method 
is notably inferior to the case study method owing to this ambiguity.
Specific Recollections of Sufficiency
Another study using survey methodology adopts a similar approach, but uses a measure that is 
more fine-tuned and service specific. M. Lamothe and Lamothe (2012a, 2012b) get at competi-
tion through the use of a 5-point scale question in which the respondent chooses a point on the 
scale with “1” indicating there are many vendors in the market and “5” indicating there are very 
few for a given service. Such a measure has two advantages over the case study and general suf-
ficiency methods. First, it allows researchers to directly link levels of competition to specific 
services in a large number of jurisdictions. Second, it accounts for matters of degree as opposed 
to simply dichotomizing competitive and noncompetitive markets.
However, it also has a notable weakness. It introduces subjectivity bias, since what constitutes 
“many” or “very few” could vary depending on the respondent’s disposition regarding contract-
ing. Privatization advocates might argue that having two bidders is sufficient to rate the environ-
ment as reasonably competitive, others might have higher thresholds. As such, the scale scores 
can mean different things across the cases.
The Use of Proxies
Another common technique used to account for competition is the adoption of proxies. This is 
the most frequently used method in large-N studies at the local level. The most regularly used 
proxies are metro status (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Greene, 1996; S. Lamothe et al., 2008; Levin 
& Tadelis, 2010) and population (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Carr, LeRoux, & Shrestha, 2009; 
Hefetz & Warner, 2004; Kodrzycki, 1998; Levin & Tadelis, 2010). The logic for both is essen-
tially the same—larger jurisdictions should have better developed markets with more vendors, 
and thus, should be more competitive (Ferris & Graddy, 1986). Specifically, it is posited that 
large metro areas should be relatively more likely to contract for services since they are more 
likely to reap the benefits of market discipline. Another proxy that has been employed is the total 
number of private firms in the county (S. Lamothe et al., 2008). The assumption in this case is 
that the existence of greater numbers of firms indicates the likelihood of greater competition.
All proxies discussed above suffer from the same weakness. They are global and are unable to 
differentiate by service, which assumes the same levels of market development across services 
within a jurisdiction. While it is likely true that small and/or rural areas have weaker markets 
generally, it seems probable that even the largest jurisdictions would suffer from noncompetitive-
ness for some services. These proxies simply cannot address this issue.
Recollections Regarding the Number of Responders
The measures of competitiveness, up to this point, have either suffered from being somewhat 
subjective or global in nature. However, scholars have attempted to address these issues by 
employing survey designs that explicitly ask respondents to make their best estimates as to the 
number of bids received during the most recent procurement effort for a given service (Bel & 
Fageda, 2011; Fernandez, 2007; Hefetz & Warner, 2012). Such a measure is very useful in that it 
directly ties market characteristics to the relevant jurisdiction-service pair, which allows for a 
much stronger test of the relationship between competition and contracting behavior. In addition, 
it seems to address the subjectivity issue noted regarding the M. Lamothe and Lamothe (2012a, 
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2012b) measure by using specific reference to the number of vendors when asking questions as 
to the extent of competition.
However, there are some concerns here as well. One issue is that, to date, most such efforts 
ask respondents to estimate the number of bidders for a large number of services at one time 
(both Fernandez, 2007, and Hefetz & Warner, 2012, use the 67 services found in the ICMA sur-
veys1). It may be asking a bit much of respondents to accurately remember such a volume of 
information without reviewing actual bidding documents, especially when some of the procure-
ment activities may have taken place years ago. For this reason, the accuracy of such measures 
may be in question.
Counting the Number of Responders
The most straightforward method of assessing the competitiveness of the service market is to 
ascertain how many potential vendors actually responded to a given competition (e.g., Savas, 
2002; Schlesinger et al., 1986). This is done by reviewing competitive tendering documents to 
examine exactly how many entities participated. Such a technique seems to offer the most precise 
measure of competition since it utilizes the historical record to establish exactly how a procure-
ment process played out. As such, it would seem superior to the techniques discussed to this 
point, at least with respect to accurately gauging competitiveness.
Unfortunately, gathering such information is a challenging undertaking and requires gaining 
access to and examining a large number of contract documents. The level of resources required 
for such an endeavor is often prohibitive. Hence, researchers utilizing this technique tend to 
restrict their analyses to a relatively small number of competitions within a limited geographical 
boundary (Savas, 2002, looked at three social services in New York City and Schlesinger et al., 
1986, focused on mental health care in Massachusetts). Therefore, while count measures do 
appear superior as true indicators of the market environment, the challenges involved with gath-
ering them seems to make them unlikely candidates for use in large-N, generalizable studies.
Furthermore, as constructed to date, they may also overestimate the true competitiveness of 
the market. This is so because, in any solicitation, there is a significant probability that some 
responders are completely ill-prepared to undertake the given task and have no chance of win-
ning the competition. The key to unleashing the purported benefits of competition is that winners 
should perform well (i.e., high quality, low price) because they fear replacement by rivals (Savas, 
2000). However, nonviable vendors or notably inferior ones do not serve this function. A strong 
argument can be made that such bidders should not be counted since they do not assist the con-
tracting government in leveraging the benefits of competition (i.e., they do not serve as credible 
replacements). Thus, only acceptable bidders should be considered.
Acceptable Bidders
In this study, I gather information to construct a narrower, yet more rigorous measure of competi-
tion, and use it as a baseline to compare other measures from past studies. There are two noncon-
troversial ways in which bidders might be identified as lacking sufficient quality. First, there are 
commonly administrative deadlines, such as filing dates, which must be met for bidders to move 
forward in the process. Respondents who miss closing dates (also known as “fatal criteria”) are 
generally dropped from the competition. It seems fairly straightforward that such organizations 
should not be counted among the bidding entities as they are never truly “in the game” even 
though they may show up on the original responder rolls and have their names carried forward 
for administrative reasons.
Second, contracting governments might set minimum bid scores that must be achieved for the 
bidder to be considered for awards. It seems a stretch to argue that vendors who do not reach 
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minimum requirements and, therefore, are eliminated from competition, are likely candidates for 
enforcing market discipline. Likewise, these vendors should not be counted in an analysis of 
competition. For the sake of this research, that subset of responders who meet the fatal criteria 
and score at or above the minimum cut-off are termed acceptable bidders—a more stringent 
measure than the raw number of initial responders. While gathering information regarding 
acceptable bidders poses even greater challenges to researchers due to its intensive resource com-
mitment, this type of measure serves two useful purposes: first, it provides an objective as well 
as conservative baseline measure for competition from which to evaluate the efficacy of other 
estimates. Second, it may offer a more realistic picture regarding the true competitiveness of the 
market for social service outsourcing.2
The Florida DCF
The DCF is Florida’s largest social service agency and offers a wide array of services to assist 
and protect vulnerable citizens. It divides its services into 10, sometimes overlapping, program 
areas which are reviewed in Table 1.
DCF Contracting
DCF contracts extensively for service delivery and has done so for many years. For example, a 
report written for the Florida legislature states that as of October 1, 2006, it held 966 contracts 
with an annualized value of $1.3 billion and a total (including multi-year commitments) value of 
Table 1. Services Provided by the Florida Department of Children and Families.
Program area Function FY 2011 budget
Adult protective 
services
Prevent abuse or exploitation of vulnerable adults.
Assist vulnerable adults in living reasonably independent 
lives.
$54,347,340
Child care Protect the health and safety of children while in care, 
through on-site inspections, technical assistance, and 
training opportunities.
$17,602,729
Domestic violence Serve as a clearinghouse for information relating to 
domestic violence and provide supervision and 
administration of statewide prevention programs.
$31,490,363
Access TANF—Promote strong and economically self-sufficient 
families.
$633,633,509
Family safety Conduct, supervise, and administer a program for 
dependent children and their families.
$1,020,394,786
Homelessness Manage homeless grant programs. $19,250,145
Refugee services Manage refugee service provider contracts and fund cash 
and medical assistance programs.
$83,671,618
Strengthening families Intervention services focusing on healthy marriage 
education.
N/A
Substance abuse Provision of a comprehensive continuum of substance 
abuse prevention, detoxification, and treatment services.
$215,672,421
Mental health Manage the state mental health program.
Administer and manage secure facilities and programs for 
treatment of defendants found to be incompetent or 
acquitted of felonies by reason of insanity.
$764,060,545
Note. Adapted from DCF Quick Facts (Retrieved from http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/newsroom/docs/quickfacts.pdf).
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$3.8 billion (Florida Legislature, 2006). However, due to the nature of these services, many of 
these contracts are statutorily exempted from competitive tendering processes that are required 
for other similarly priced contracts.3 It is important to point out these exemptions remove the 
requirement for competitive tendering, but do not ban the procedure. In fact, DCF guidelines 
encourage competitive solicitation even for exempted services. Still, most such contracts are 
noncompetitively procured, although use of competitive procurement has increased recently (M. 
Lamothe & Lamothe, 2009).
The most common competitive procurement techniques used by the Department are “Requests 
for Proposals” (RFPs) and “Invitations to Negotiate” (ITNs). Both methods evaluate bidders on 
specific and fairly sophisticated sets of criteria and are used when services are not easily described 
and, hence, not good candidates for unit price bidding (i.e., bid price alone, is not sufficient for 
choosing a vendor). Most commonly, a number of evaluators score the bidders independently and 
these scores are averaged to produce a composite, overall bid score. The potential vendors are 
then compared on these aggregated values. In general, the bidder with the highest score is 
awarded the contract although this need not be the case if two bidders are very close, but the 
lower one shows superiority on a pertinent value (e.g., ties to the community) not properly 
accounted for in the formal evaluation criteria.
While, as described above, exemptions are common, DCF nonetheless utilizes competitive 
techniques quite often. A snapshot taken from Florida’s Accounting and Information data system 
(FLAIR—discussed in more detail below) shows that in 2008, 202 of DCF’s 777 (26.0%) health 
and human service contracts were coded as utilizing competitive procedures. However, a closer 
examination of this database showed that the number “202” might be a bit inflated. For example, 
some of the contracts that were listed as pertaining to social services, where actually for technical 
support and a few were reported to me by their contract managers to have been noncompetitively 
procured. In addition, as expanded upon below, some actually represented grants. Regardless, a 
sizable portion of contracts utilize competitive procedures. This frequent use of competitive ten-
dering combined with the sophisticated nature of the processes used (i.e., the use of RFPs or 
ITNs), makes DCF an ideal source of information regarding the competitiveness of a wide vari-
ety of social service contracts—not only can the number of bidders be identified but also the 
quality of the bids, as revealed by bid scores, can be examined and factored into the analysis.
DCF Grants
The DCF administers a number of grant programs designed to assist local agencies in pursuance 
of their efforts to address social problems. Such grants are usually awarded through competitive 
processes, which may consist of statewide or regional competitions. In many ways, the process 
of securing grant money is very similar to winning competitive contracts. Both require agencies 
to submit detailed applications to demonstrate they have the capacity and expertise to deliver the 
services for which they seek funding. As with contracts, these applications are reviewed by teams 
of public managers that assign scores to each application based on a variety of criteria. These 
scores are then used to rank candidates and make awards. In many cases, grants are also managed 
similarly to contracts in that they are given “contract” numbers, entered into the FLAIR database 
discussed above, and assigned to contract managers who monitor and oversee the grantees. 
Further like contracts, grants can have varied timeframes, with some rebid annually and others 
spread out over a number of years.
In this research, I have gathered data on two such competitive grant programs: Prevention 
Partnership grants (PPGs) and Emergency Shelter grants (ESGs). The Prevention Partnership 
Program is federally funded through the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant 
and is administered in Florida by the DCF in collaboration with the Florida Department of 
Education and the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (Florida Department of Children and 
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Families, 2009). The goal is “to encourage school/community substance abuse prevention part-
nerships” by “fund[ing] effective programs and strategies that are relevant to community preven-
tion needs” (Florida Department of Children and Families, 2009, p. 4). The program was begun 
in 2001 and the awards are for 3 years. “Applicants [currently] may request up to $150,000 to 
conduct direct and/or indirect prevention activities and prevention capacity-building activities” 
(Florida Department of Children and Families, 2009, p. 3). Only schools, school districts, or 
nonprofit organizations are eligible to receive funding—for-profit entities are expressly forbid-
den from winning PPGs (Florida Department of Children and Families, 2009). These grants are 
awarded regionally, resulting in the running of multiple concurrent competitions in award years.
ESGs are also federally funded, through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). HUD directly funds many cities and counties, but also sets aside money 
for the state to distribute to areas that have not received awards (Florida Department of Children 
and Families, 2010a). Florida does so through the use of statewide grant competitions. ESGs are 
annual grants (although the 2010 cycle utilized a 2-year window) and have two components. 
Facility grants can be used for emergency shelter renovation and the supply of essential services, 
such as assistance in obtaining permanent housing or counseling (under restrictions not germane 
to the current research effort; Florida Department of Children and Families, 2010a). Prevention 
grants aim “to serve persons at imminent risk of losing their permanent housing and becoming 
homeless” (Florida Department of Children and Families, 2010b, p. 3). Both types are currently 
capped at $100,000 and, as with PPGs, for-profit firms are ineligible. Rather, these grants are 
restricted to local government units and secular and religious nonprofit 501(c)(3) entities.
Managing Contracts Versus Managing Grants
In this study, I examine both contracts and grants in an effort to better understand the competitive 
nature of social service delivery in Florida. It is reasonable to question whether these two meth-
ods of funding service delivery are similar enough to warrant their inclusion in a single research 
design. Simply put, from a management perspective, the two are strikingly similar. As discussed 
above, the competitive procurement processes utilized are quite comparable. Furthermore, the 
management of contracts and grants are nearly identical. A passage from DCF’s Guide to grant 
solicitations and awards highlights this point:
Subsections 287.057(15), and 402.7305, F.S., require the Department, for each contractual services 
contract, to designate a Department employee to be responsible for enforcing performance of the contract 
terms and conditions and serve as a liaison with the contractor. While there is no corresponding 
requirement in law that creates a similar requirement for grants, the Department’s policy is that the 
fundamental premise that underlies the statutes is applicable for grants as well as procurement contracts. 
(Florida Department of Children and Families, 2010c, pp. 6-2)
In a practical sense, this means that grant managers review and approve invoices as well as 
undertake accountability efforts, such as on-site visits, in the same manner as their contract man-
ager brethren. There are a few differences worthy of mention; however, none are particularly 
relevant to accountability issues. Since grants tend to be narrower in substantive scope, they are 
more likely than contracts to be governed under a single funds disbursement regime. For exam-
ple, funds for ESGs are disbursed on a cost reimbursement basis, while funds for a mental health 
contract may be paid out in a variety of ways (e.g., per unit cost, lump sum) for the different 
components of the contract. In addition, due to the way in which grant monies are allocated, DCF 
has more flexibility in “moving money around” with grants than with contracts. Other than these 
minor differences, contracts and grants appear to be treated nearly identically.4
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Data Collection and Measurement
Competition in this study is measured in a variety of ways so as to allow for a comparison of 
alternate methods against the baseline metric of the number of acceptable bidders, described 
above. Specifically, document-based counts of all responders and acceptable bidders, recollec-
tions regarding the number of bidders, and proxy measures are gathered. Furthermore, informa-
tion on vendor performance is collected to allow for a test of the relationship between competition 
and performance.
I survey Florida Department of Children and Families contract officers to gather the informa-
tion required to construct the count measures. These data include a mix of contract and grant 
competitions for social services. As Cooper (2003, p. 85) points out, there are three basic types 
of contracting officers. Procurement contracting officers (PCOs) solicit and select vendors, 
administrative contract officers (ACOs), manage contract execution, and termination contract 
officers (TCOs) ensure continuity of service delivery and assist in smoothing transitions when 
vendors are replaced. The officers surveyed for this project are ACOs, although they might also 
serve as TCOs, as necessary. ACOs, who are also referred to as “contract managers” in the Florida 
context, do not participate in procurement efforts. However, they are the ones who maintain the 
contract file during post-award periods, which gives them access to the bid records and other 
pertinent information.
In the spring of 2008, I obtained a snapshot from the Florida Accounting and Information 
Resource (FLAIR) database. This resource contains all of the contracts administered by DCF at 
that moment in time. From these data, I isolated all social service contracts (as opposed to con-
tracts for technical support, for example) and further identified the subset of social service con-
tracts that underwent competitive procurement efforts. As previously discussed, approximately 
200 contracts qualified under both criteria. These contracts are administered by 885 managers 
indicating that, on average, each manager is responsible for about 2.3 contracts. On July 22, 
2009, all managers were contacted with a request to fill out a survey and submit supporting docu-
mentation as they felt would be helpful. A follow-up effort was conducted during the winter of 
2010. Phone contacts were also made to try and solicit more responses and to clarify existing 
responses, if needed. In the end, information on 49 contract procurements and 35 grant competi-
tions were received from 22 DCF contract officers. From these data, I identify the number of 
responders, the number of acceptable bidders, as well as estimates of contractor performance. 
The number of responders includes all entities that responded to the RFP or ITN, regardless of 
how far they progressed in the process. Acceptable bidders are the subset of responders that met 
all required deadlines and whose bids scores were at or above the stated minimum acceptable 
values set for the competition.
In addition, I adapt Hefetz and Warner’s (2012) measure as a third way to account for per-
ceived competition. Specifically, I identify services from their city and county level research that 
are similar to the ones provided by DCF and assign their estimates regarding the number of bid-
ders to these state-level services to see whether they are reasonable approximations of the levels 
of competitiveness found through my DCF data gathering.6
The final competition data collected are two proxy measures. The first is metro status which, 
as reviewed previously, is very commonly used in the literature to account for competitiveness of 
the contracting environment. The second is a population measure, which shares theoretical 
underpinnings with the metro status variable. Both tap into the idea that more densely populated 
areas likely offer more vendor options. However, applying them to the current research requires 
some adjustment because, unlike the local level studies from which they are borrowed, DCF 
service delivery is a multi-jurisdictional affair. The primary DCF service delivery unit is the cir-
cuit. There are 20 such circuits, which align with Florida’s judicial circuits, and each contains 
between one and seven counties, depending on how populous the counties are.7 As such, adjust-
ments must be made. Metro status is defined for each procurement competition by first assigning 
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each county in its circuit of origin a value such that 1 = a county that contains a core metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) city, 2 = a county in an MSA that does not contain a core city, and 3 = a 
county not located in an MSA. The metro measure is aggregated over each circuit by taking the 
weighted (by population) average of these scores for all counties in the circuit and rounding to an 
integer value. In the end, only two contracts and one grant competition code “3,” so they are 
combined with “2s” to form a core versus noncore dichotomy for the sake of analysis.8 Population 
density is also calculated for each circuit and serves as the second proxy measure of competition 
for each contract or grant.9
In addition to the above data gathering efforts, I also briefly interviewed two senior managers 
in DCF’s contract office (the staff director and the senior policy writer) in an effort to elaborate 
on some of my findings regarding competition (discussed below). The interview, which was done 
over the phone, took place on November 17, 2011, and lasted about 35 min.
Performance is ascertained by asking the contract managers to rate the performance of the 
winning vendors on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from performing “very poorly” to “very 
well.” Contract managers serve as the point of contact between the vendor and the department 
and collect and organize all relevant information regarding vendor performance. For example, if 
a monitoring effort uncovers problems that warrant corrective action, the manager is the one to 
record the problems in the contract file, contact all relevant parties, and coordinate remediation 
efforts. As such, they are in a good position to see the “big picture” regarding overall perfor-
mance and should be able to assign useful ratings. Furthermore, as mentioned above, contract 
managers do not generally participate in contract award decision making. This is important 
because, if they were major players in the process, how well the contractor is doing might be seen 
as a reflection on the managers’ own job performance (since they chose them). Such a situation 
would likely lead to a bias toward positive vendor evaluations that is, fortunately, avoided in the 
current circumstance.10 In the end, however, managers seem reasonably satisfied with their ven-
dors in that only 3.6% of cases scored one or two on Performance. Therefore, these categories 
were collapsed into the third grouping resulting in a three-category, ordered measure of perfor-
mance such that “1” = “poor/adequate,” “2” = “well,” and “3” = “very well.”
Unfortunately, performance estimates are not available for many of the competitions. 
Generally speaking, data for grant competitions were gathered from aggregate reports that made 
collecting information on specific vendor performance difficult (i.e., I could identify the bidding 
agencies, their scores, and the like, but generally could not match them to managers to offer their 
opinions on the quality of service delivery). And, a number of contract managers chose not to 
provide performance measures. In the end, I have performance information for 31 competitions 
(25 contracts and 6 grants). In addition to the data collected above, I also have information on 52 
noncompetitive DCF social service contracts. These data were collected in a previous effort 
focused on noncompetitive procurement but are compatible with the current data in that an iden-
tical contractor performance measure was gathered.11 Hence, these noncompetitive cases can be 
used in conjunction with the current data to examine the relationship between competition and 
performance. If market theory is correct, competitively procured vendors should outperform 
noncompetitive ones and performance should improve as the level of competition increases (or 
at least until competitive thresholds are reached).
Findings
This section reports the results from the comparisons of the different competition measures and 
the analysis of the relationship between competition and performance as well as a discussion of 
the quality of losing bidders. The overall findings suggest that the recollection-based count mea-
sure reasonably approximates the actual document-based count measures in terms of estimating 
the number of initial responders. The measures do not converge as well when competition is 
defined in a more stringent manner (i.e., counting the number of “acceptable” bidders). Proxies 
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do not seem to perform as effectively as the recollection-based measure in assessing competition 
although they are able to provide a rough feel for the existence of competition. Substantively, the 
findings of this study confirm the common presence of weak competition across different human 
services. None of the service areas examined (both contracts and grants) exceeded the minimum 
competitive threshold of three (keeping in mind that the literature indicates that four or even five 
bidders might be preferable). Lack of competition deepens when accounting for the viability and 
quality of bidders, as measured by the number of acceptable bidders. However, losing bidders do 
appear to be of similar quality as the winners. Finally, performance is neither meaningfully 
related to competitive sourcing nor significantly associated with the extent of competition. In the 
following, I review the findings in details.
Contracts: Initial Responders, Acceptable Bids, and Recollection of Bidders
Table 2 shows how three competition measures compare (two document-based count methods 
and the recollection-based estimate of the number of bidders). While there appears to be some 
variation by service type, the table clearly indicates that by no means, based on any measure, is 
competition robust. Concerning the 49 contracts for which I have data, the average number of 
initial responders (third column) is a less than adequate 1.73. The far right column contains the 
averages for the services (1.88) as collected by Hefetz and Warner (2012). The extent of competi-
tiveness predicted by these perception-based measures appears to align reasonably well with the 
initial responder counts. A notable finding is that this measure and the actual counts of initial 
responders appear to overestimate the true competitive nature of the bidding process as assessed 
by the number of acceptable bids (1.29 from the fourth column). The difference between the 
initial and acceptable bidders, 0.44, is statistically significant (p = .001) and also of substantive 
import—losing nearly half a bidder, on average, is impactful when so few bidders are available 
in the first place. Behind the averages, is some information worthy of further discussion. Of the 
49 contract competitions, 24 (or 49.0%) reported only one responder and 34 (or 70.8%)12 had 
only one acceptable bid. Furthermore, only 5 (10.2%) had three or more responders. However, 
when only acceptable bidders are included, just 3 cases (6.3%) achieve the minimum competitive 
threshold and none are above it.
Grants: Responders Per Award and Acceptable Bidders
The results for grant competitions are very similar (see Table 3). Once again, competitive thresh-
olds are not achieved, or really even approached, and accounting for acceptability leads to a 








Recalled number of 
bidders—Hefetz and 
Warner (2012)
Mental health 22 1.91 1.43c 2.05
Health services 12 2.00 1.08 1.76
Family safety 12 1.33 1.33 1.36
Adult protective/substance 
abuse services
3 1.00 1.00 2.35
Overall 49 1.73 1.29d 1.88
aIncludes all agencies that initiated the bid process.
bIncludes only those agencies that met the fatal criteria and minimum bid score requirements.
cBid score information was not available for one mental health contract competition, thus acceptability could not be evaluated (i.e.,  
n = 21).
dDue to the exclusion listed above, n = 48; average responders − average acceptable bids = 1.73 − 1.29 = 0.44, p = .001.
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significantly lower number of bidders (difference = 0.34, p = .000). While grants might appear a 
bit more competitive than contracts, with on average 0.11 more responders and 0.21 more accept-
able bidders per award, the differences are not statistically significant (p = .625 and .234, respec-
tively). Looking inside the numbers, 7 of the 35 grant competitions (20.0%) received only a 
single responder per award, but this number increases notably when only acceptable bidders are 
counted—18 or 51.4% of cases, averaged one bidder under the more selective standard.
The above adds further support to the common finding in the literature that competition in 
social service markets tends to be anemic. In addition, the importance of accounting for the 
acceptability of bidders is demonstrated—simple responder counts tend to overestimate market 
potential.
Proxy Measures
I also look at proxy measures of competition. As mentioned above, due to the paucity of nonMSA 
contracts and grants, the metro status variable is collapsed to a dichotomous measure—core ver-
sus noncore. This allows me to assess the efficacy of metro status through the use of difference 
of means tests. The result, found in Table 4, indicate that core and noncore contracts and grants 
may be differentiable in terms of the raw number of potential bidders that respond to solicita-
tions. The relationship is in the posited direction in that core areas appear to have slightly higher 
numbers of responders than their noncore peers. Specifically, 1.97 bidders, on average, respond 
in core areas while only 1.55 bidders respond in noncore areas. The difference, 0.42, is margin-
ally significant with a p value of .079. However, the different types of locales are not differen-
tiable when the more stringent measure of acceptable bidders is employed.
Table 3. Competition in Florida Social Service Grants.
Grant type






Prevention partnership 2004 14 1.67 1.15
Prevention partnership 2009 12 2.12 1.99
Emergency shelter—facility 5 1.43 1.18
Emergency shelter—prevention 4 2.10 1.68
Overall 35 1.84 1.50c
Note. Emergency shelter facility grants cover 2004, 2006-2009; emergency shelter prevention grants cover 2004, 
2006-2008.
aIncludes all agencies that initiated the bid process.
bIncludes only those agencies that met the fatal criteria and minimum bid score requirements.
cAverage responders − average acceptable bids = 1.84 − 1.50 = 0.34, p = .000.
Table 4. Differences in Competition by Metro Status.
Core areas Noncore areas Difference p value
Average responders 1.97 1.55 0.42 .079
n 42 27  
Average acceptable 
bidders
1.43 1.38 0.05 .832
n 42 26  
Note. Six contracts and nine grant competitions were conducted on a statewide basis and are, therefore, not included 
in this analysis.
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Table 5. Assessing the Relative Quality of Acceptable Bidders.
Type of competition
Winning score as a 
percentage of maximum 
possible score % (n)
First loser’s score as a 
percentage of winning 
score % (n)
Second loser’s score as 
a percentage of winning 
score % (n)
Third loser’s score as a 
percentage of winning 
score % (n)
Contracts 81.9 (38) 91.9 (14) 92.7 (3) —
Grants 77.9 (35) 97.6 (18) 94.0 (14) 90.0 (12)
Overall 80.0 (73) 95.1 (32) 93.8 (17) 90.0 (12)
Note. Since grant competitions generally have multiple winners, the lowest winning bid score is used to calculate the values reported in 
this table.
In addition, I examine how well the other proxy, population density, accounts for competition, 
through the use of correlation analysis. Bivariate correlations between population density and the 
two count measures lead to results somewhat similar to those attained using metro status. 
However, while in the posited directions, neither correlation is statistically significant, but popu-
lation density’s relationship with the number of responders is stronger than with acceptable bid-
ders (r = .163, p = .180 and r = .013, p = .914, respectively). Thus, while metro status, and to a 
lesser degree population density, might be reasonable proxies for the number of responders, 
neither seems to adequately reflect the more rigorous measure.
Quality of Losing Bidders
Beyond the simple number of bidders, it is also imperative that the losers are “up to the task” of 
enforcing market discipline. That is, they must be capable of serving as credible replacements. 
Generally speaking, the universe of social service contractors in any given area is small and they 
tend to know one another. As such, winners should be able to fairly accurately gauge the quality 
of their competitors. Furthermore, the contracting process in Florida is very transparent. 
Contracting documents are public records and award announcements very often include the 
scores for all bidders. In instances in which there is an oversight in this regard, these documents 
are subject to Florida’s sunshine laws and would be readily available through a request to the 
contracting agency.13 Hence, incumbents are likely to have a pretty good feel for the security of 
their position, which could impact behavior. With this in mind, I turn to an examination of the 
losing acceptable bidders. Specifically, I compare the bid scores of the first, second, and third-
place losers, when available, to those of the winners. The results for this analysis are found in 
Table 5. The second column compares the winning score to the maximum possible score.14 
Generally, we see that DCF appears to set rather high standards that vendors find difficult to 
reach. The average winner, for the 73 competitions for which I have relevant data, receives only 
80.0% of the possible points. Contract winners seem to do a bit better than grant winners in this 
regard; but overall, we see what would traditionally translate to “C+” to “B−” grades.
The staff director for DCF contract personnel, whom I interviewed, offers some interesting 
insights concerning the apparent discrepancy between DCF maximum scores and vendor achieve-
ment in this regard. His impression is that this finding does not indicate DCF standards are too 
high nor that vendors are generally lacking in quality. Rather, he argues that two factors are likely 
at play. First, DCF tends to rate bidders on a variety of 3-point scale items and aggregate the 
results. As such measures are rather rough, any subtractions can lead to large reductions in over-
all score. Furthermore, the items are commonly weighted as well, which can further exaggerate 
the impact of any deductions. Second, most of the vendors submitting bids are small nonprofits 
that lack management capacity and, therefore, do not tend to present themselves well in such 
competitions (i.e., they do not put together polished bid packages). They are also unlikely to 
utilize consultants to assist them in preparing solicitation responses. Hence, as the staff director 
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puts it, you might be dealing with an excellent service delivery organization that simply does not 
look that good on paper.
These concerns are becoming more relevant, he adds, as for-profits enter the market. They 
tend to either use consultants or have the internal capacity to compile very professional propos-
als, even when they are not particularly effective service deliverers. To address these inconsisten-
cies between for-profit and nonprofit bidding tendencies, DCF has started to adjust their bidding 
procedures to include bidder presentations which better allow DCF to determine the true poten-
tial of responding entities.
Moving to the third column (Table 5), we see that the losers with the highest scores appear to 
be competitive to winners, especially with regard to grant competitions. Overall, the scores for 
first losers average 95.1% of the winning score. There is only a slight drop-off when we move to 
the second losers. While there are no third losers regarding contracts, because of the nature of 
grant competitions (i.e., multiple awards per competition), it is much more common to be able to 
identify three (or more) nonwinning grant bidders. And, these vendors tend to stack up pretty 
well, with their scores averaging 90.0% of the lowest winning bid score. So overall, when there 
are losers (but remember, this is commonly not the case—a bit over 60% of the competitions in 
this analysis attracted only a single acceptable bidder per award), they tend to be pretty similar to 
the winners in terms of their bid scores.
Competition and Performance
Although the results to this point indicate low levels of competition for DCF social service con-
tracts and grants, might there be something about the competitive procedures themselves that can 
lead to benefits? The most common expectation in this regard is that competitive procurement 
should lead to cost savings. However, this is not an appropriate metric in the current circum-
stance. DCF tends to set the value of social service contracts ahead of time (i.e., how much they 
will spend) and compares vendors on what they offer for the given sum of money. Florida is not 
unique in this respect—Schlesinger et al. (1986) discuss similar practices in Massachusetts. 
Furthermore, cost savings are not applicable to grant situations where the goal is to get predeter-
mined funds to qualified vendors. For these reasons, I examine whether there is evidence that the 
use of competitive processes might be able to weed out weak vendors and, therefore, promote 
better performance than might be expected when awards are made noncompetitively.
To accomplish this, I run a series of ordered logit models in which Performance (described 
above) is regressed on different measures of competition, after controlling for other possible 
influences. The measures of competition are as follows: (a) Competitive process is dichotomous 
and codes “1” if competitive procurement procedures were used, (b) Number of bidders identifies 
the number of responders for the given solicitation, and (c) Acceptable bidders accounts for the 
number of bidders who met the fatal criteria and minimum bid scores. To protect the results from 
potentially spurious relationships, a number of control variables are utilized.
Vendor ownership is often posited to be related to performance. For example, privatization 
advocates, such as Savas (2002), argue that for-profits should outperform nonprofits and other 
government vendors because the profit motive gives them incentives to deliver high quality ser-
vices at low costs. Weisbrod (1977), on the other hand, emphasizes the goal congruence found 
between nonprofit vendors and their contracting governments to assert that nonprofits might 
outperform their for-profit peers. With this in mind, For-profit and Nonprofit account for the type 
of vendor (other government contractors serve as the reference category15). In addition, I account 
for the management capacity of the district by borrowing M. Lamothe and Lamothe’s (2010) 
measure, which is dichotomous with “1” identifying high capacity districts.16 The expectation is 
that higher capacity districts should be better able to manage the entire delivery process (i.e., 
vendor selection and contract execution) and achieve better results. Furthermore, I control for 
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two district characteristics, population density and per capita personal income, which might 
influence contracting outcomes. Finally, I include district dummies to protect against distinct-
level idiosyncrasies that might play a role, but are not captured in my other independent vari-
ables.17 The descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the performance model can 
be found in Table 6 and descriptions and source information can be found in the appendix (Table 
A1).
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.18,19 In none of the three models is the vari-
able capturing competition statistically significant. Rather, things like vendor type, population 
density, and the district in which the contract resides influence perceptions of vendor perfor-
mance. For example, other government contractors seem to outperform their for-profit peers. 
While this finding is in-line with the results of previous research (M. Lamothe & Lamothe, 
2010), it is important to point out that the paucity of government vendors (n=5) in the current data 
set requires us to not make too much of this result. In addition, more densely populated areas 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Performance Model.
Variables M SD Minimum Maximum
Performance 2.114 0.679 1.000 3.000
Competitive process 0.354 0.481 0.000 1.000
Number of bidders 0.547 0.855 0.000 4.000
Acceptable bidders 0.461 0.710 0.000 3.000
For-profit 0.253 0.438 0.000 1.000
Nonprofit 0.684 0.468 0.000 1.000
High capacity district 0.354 0.481 0.000 1.000
Population density 5.464 3.882 0.734 14.254
Personal income 30.739 6.717 22.140 44.050
Note. n = 79 (78 for acceptable bidders).
Table 7. Evaluating the Impact of Competition on Performance.a
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 b SE b SE b SE
Competitive process −0.163 0.508 — — — —
Number of bidders — — 0.055 0.277 — —
Acceptable bidders — — — — −0.023 0.342
For-profit −1.906* 1.107 −1.893* 1.104 −1.896* 1.111
Nonprofit −1.481 1.045 −1.486 1.043 −1.497 1.044
High capacity district −0.255 0.660 −0.189 0.664 −0.198 0.671
Population density (00s) −0.181** 0.092 −0.182** 0.091 −0.170* 0.093
Personal income (000s) −0.044 0.043 −0.042 0.043 −0.042 0.043
District 2 −3.698*** 1.066 −3.612*** 1.063 −3.554*** 1.062
District 3 −3.698*** 1.263 −3.683*** 1.262 −3.599*** 1.262
District 4 −3.002*** 1.027 −3.090*** 1.037 −2.997*** 1.033
χ2 21.89*** 21.88*** 20.90**
Pseudo R2 .172 .172 .165
nb 79 79 78
aAs “performance” is a 3-point ordered variable, the models are estimated using ordered logit.
b28 competitive and 51 noncompetitive contracts (27 competitive for “acceptable bidders” model).
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01, two-tailed.
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appear to be associated with poorer performance, on average. Why this would be the case is 
unclear, but it might be symptomatic of the general challenges associated with delivery of social 
services in urban areas. That is, urban areas often represent more difficult environments with 
regards to crime and poverty than their suburban and rural peers. However, the main driver of 
differences in performance ratings appears to be district-level idiosyncrasies, with Districts 2, 3, 
and 4 rating their vendors more poorly than the reference districts.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, I offer a more rigorous test of competition in the social services than has been done 
in the past. While I find some evidence of convergence for past measures, the concern is that they 
all seem to overestimate competition when compared to the number of acceptable bidders. As 
such, competition in the social services may be even more restrained than previously believed. 
Below, I discuss several implications of my analysis for the contracting literature.
This research demonstrates the efficacy of the more precise measure of competition and the 
importance of ensuring that public managers are aware of the difference between simple respond-
ers and acceptable bidders when answering questions on competitiveness. On the other hand, by 
looking at the bidder quality closely, I find evidence that if at least two acceptable bidders can be 
located, the loser may well be of high enough quality to serve as a credible replacement for the 
incumbent should it not perform well. This is potentially good news in that such competitors are 
more likely than nonviable options to enforce market discipline. However, the relatively high 
probability that competitive thresholds will not be reached is a continuing concern as anticom-
petitive behaviors are more likely in such environments. These findings highlight the possible 
value of managed competition (Savas, 2000) where public agencies compete with private ven-
dors to win contracts. Public bidders can serve to increase the competitiveness of the process and 
in-house capacity adds valuable information that should assist contracting governments to better 
understand production costs and best practices (Miranda & Lerner, 1995; Warner & Hefetz, 
2004) allowing them to be smart buyers (Kettl, 1993). As such, in-house capacity may also lower 
the substantial time and resources that might be needed to recruit multiple vendors in an effort to 
manufacture competition (Johnston & Girth, 2012).
I also explore the link between competition and performance and do not find evidence of a 
relationship. While this result is not unique (e.g., M. Lamothe & Lamothe, 2010), it is contrary 
to the assertions of contracting theory and calls into question the efficacy of efforts to increase 
competition. Combined with the above result, the message to public managers is that contracting 
for social services must be done with care. The advice of scholars like Cooper (2003) and Sclar 
(2000) that “management matters,” must be taken very seriously. Governments without the 
capacity to nurture and maintain strong working relationships with their vendors, above and 
beyond simple monitoring, to include assisting them in improving service delivery as necessary, 
will likely not be able to get the best deal for the public (Cooper, 2003) regardless of the presence 
of competitive sourcing. Of course, it is important to point out that some scholars argue that 
competition can actually diminish performance in social service contracting (Johnston et al., 
2004; Milward & Provan, 2000). This is so because it can lead to service disruptions for clients 
as they are forced to switch providers when contracts change. Competition can also make pro-
vider networks unstable as members are replaced. This can disrupt the coordination needed to 
maximize network outputs and lead to learning curve costs as new vendors try to “get up to 
speed” regarding their network obligations. From this perspective, a lack of competition is not 
nearly such a concern. However, the need for governmental capacity is not diminished.
As with all research, this study has a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed. Even 
though this article accounts for a more expansive set of social services than has been done in the 
past, it is still limited to a single state, Florida, and the number of competitions, 84, is fewer than 
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ideal. Future efforts, accounting for other jurisdictions and possibly greater numbers of procure-
ment efforts, should be undertaken to verify the findings presented here. A closer examination of 
the link between competition and performance is also warranted. There is a general paucity of 
such studies that focus on social service contracting and nearly none, to my knowledge, beyond 
the current analysis, that link performance to something beyond a dichotomous measure identify-
ing competitive processes (i.e., no measures of the numbers of bidders). While this study makes 
such an effort, there is certainly room for improvement. To begin, a more expansive measure of 
performance would be helpful. As previously discussed, this could be challenging in that if data 
are gathered on a variety of services, constructing compatible measures would be difficult. 
However, using a method similar to that employed by Romzek and Johnston (2005) in which 
they interview a variety of actors and review pertinent documents to rate relative performance, 
might be appropriate. In addition, a greater number of data points (the current research has per-
formance information for only 28 competitive awards) would strengthen the generalizability of 
any findings. Notwithstanding these limitations, I feel this article makes a meaningful contribu-
tion to the contracting literature through its more rigorous examination of competition and hope 
it spurs further interest and efforts moving forward.
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Table A1. Variable Descriptions.
Variables Description Source
Performance Three-category ordinal variable such that:
1 = poor/adequate; 2 = well; 3 = very well
Collected by author
Competitive process Dichotomous measure such that:
1 = competitive process employed;  
0 = otherwise
Collected by author
Number of bidders Count variable of the number of agencies 
that responded to the request for 
proposals
Collected by author
Acceptable bidders Count variable of the number of agencies 
that responded to request for proposals 
and met the fatal criteria and scored above 
established minimum bid score (a subset of 
Number of bidders)
Collected by author
For-profit Dichotomous measure such that:
1 = for-profit vendor; 0 = otherwise
Collected by author
Nonprofit Dichotomous measure such that:
1 = nonprofit vendor; 0 = otherwise
Collected by author
High capacity district Dichotomous measure such that:
1 = high management capacity district;  
0 = otherwise (reputationally derived)
M. Lamothe and Lamothe (2010)
Population density The district’s population density in hundreds 
of persons per square mile
University of Florida (2005)
Personal income The district’s per capita personal in 
thousands of dollars
University of Florida (2005)
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Notes
 1. It is possible that Bel and Fageda (2011) avoided this problem as they focus their efforts on a single 
service (solid waste collection). However, their data are drawn from a larger survey on the production 
of local services more generally, so it is unclear how many services respondents were asked to provide 
information for.
 2. A reviewer raised two interesting points on competition worthy of discussion. First, this study does 
not explicitly account for managed competition in which in-house entities bid on contracts. While a 
generally valid concern, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) simply does not utilize this 
approach for the services in question. While doing so might be wise as it ensures an additional bidder, 
political circumstances in many instances preclude this option (i.e., DCF is under a lot of pressure 
from the legislature to contract with the private sector). Second, maintenance of competitive markets 
could be enhanced by breaking contracts into multiple components or a variety of small contracts in 
close geographic proximity so as to ensure vendors fairly regular opportunities to win contracts. Such 
actions would serve to keep potential vendors in the market, as losing bids do not necessarily imply 
sustained droughts from government funding. It could also enhance performance since vendors would 
have constant incentives to burnish their reputations to increase their chances for success during the 
myriad contracting opportunities. In the current instance, my data do not allow me to account for such 
activity, but it seems unlikely that DCF is employing these strategies since it has been showing a ten-
dency toward consolidating contracts, both in terms of geographic area and contract length, over the 
past decade or so (M. Lamothe & Lamothe, 2009).
 3. Specifically, contracts in excess of $25,000 are legally required to undergo competitive procurement 
unless an exemption applies. See 2010 Florida Statutes, Title XIX, Chapter 287.057 for a discussion 
and listing of exempted services.
 4. The information in this paragraph was gleaned from discussions and email correspondences with a 
variety of DCF personnel who participate in contract and grant management.
 5. Just as a number of the contracts in FLAIR were misidentified as either being health and human ser-
vices or having been competitively procured, as discussed above, the information on some of the con-
tract managers also appears to have been incorrect or out of date. Two initial contact emails “bounced 
back” indicating the person was no longer at DCF. Efforts to call managers who had not responded to 
my initial electronic inquiry found 11 managers not listed in DCF’s directory, again indicating they 
might no longer be employed with the agency. Therefore, overall, the actual number of contract man-
agers appears to be closer to 75 than 88.
 6. Specifically, I use Hefetz and Warner’s (2012) mental health and child welfare program categories for 
my mental health and family safety service areas, respectively. I combined two of their categories for 
each of my other measures (hospital and public health for health services and elderly and mental health 
programs for adult protective/substance abuse services).
 7. Prior to 2008, DCF was organized into 14 districts which contained between 1 and 14 counties. In 
addition, to the current circuit scheme, DCF has six larger administrative units, regions, which consists 
of between two and five circuits. As the data collection for the current project took place during the 
reorganizational transition from districts to circuits (and their related regions), the contracts and grants 
included in this analysis are generally a mix of circuit and district-based. For further information on 
the 2008-2009 transition, readers are directed to Florida Senate (2009).
 8. This is very similar to the coding scheme used by Hefetz and Warner (2007).
 9. The source for the coding of the metro status variable was the U.S. Census Bureau (1999). Population 
density was derived from University of Florida (2005).
10. Of course, a convincing argument could be made that such a subjective measure is inferior to more 
objective measures such as client outcomes. While this is likely true, due to the nature of the project, 
available data do not allow for the use of objective measures. Generally speaking, no such information 
exists in anything resembling a collectible form. Furthermore, I look at a variety of different types 
of services and constructing objective measures that are comparable across the services would be a 
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Herculean task open to its own interpretational issues (i.e., any measures would likely better fit some 
services than others). Hence, my options for gathering performance indicators are very limited and I 
feel a straightforward query regarding vendor performance is the best alternative.
11. The instrument used to gather data for this article is actually a modified version of the one used to 
gather information on noncompetitive contracts. The modifications included adding requests for mate-
rial on the number of bidders, bid scores, and minimum/maximum possible bid scores. The questions 
on performance were identical.
12. The data to evaluate acceptability are missing for one case, so n = 48 when examining the number of 
acceptable bidders.
13. Personal correspondence with contract administrator.
14. I was unable to gather information on maximum possible score for 10 contract competitions.
15. There are 20 for-profit, 54 nonprofit, and 5 other government vendors in the performance analysis.
16. Districts, rather than circuits, are used in the performance analysis because the data previously col-
lected for the noncompetitive contracts are organized in this manner.
17. Unfortunately, data availability does not allow me to include other factors, such as trust between con-
tracting partners (Fernandez, 2007) and the types of monitoring undertaken (Domberger & Hensher, 
1993) that have been demonstrated to impact performance. Thus, my model is likely underspecified 
which could impact the results.
18. While Performance is measured as a 3-point scale, three respondents chose to rate their vendors as 4.5 
(on the original 5-point scaling). To place the measure back on the proper metric, I ran models with 
these values rounded up to 5 and down to 4 prior to rescaling to three categories. The results were gen-
erally robust across specifications with only small changes in p values. Overall, the round down mod-
els had better overall fit, as captured by the pseudo R2 statistics, so they are reported here. In addition, 
as the Ns in the analyses are rather small, I ran ordinary least squares regressions as a check. Again the 
differences tended to be quite small, indicating reliability in the results. Interested readers can contact 
the author for more information and the full results.
19. Tests indicate that the reported model does not violate the parallel regression assumption. However, 
earlier specifications which included two additional regressors, the number of health and social service 
organizations per 1,000 residents and the contract amount (in millions of dollars) were problematic in 
this regard, hence these variables were dropped. In addition, including dummies for all districts (less 
one for reference) showed similar volatility, so only those districts (2, 3, and 4) which are significantly 
related to the dependent variable are included in the analysis. In no alternative specification were any 
of the measures of competition statistically significant.
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